A New Distributed DC-Programming Method and its Applications by Alvarado, Alberth et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
30
8.
35
21
v2
  [
cs
.IT
]  
20
 Se
p 2
01
3
1
A New Decomposition Method for Multiuser
DC-Programming and its Applications
Alberth Alvarado, Gesualdo Scutari, and Jong-Shi Pang
Abstract—We propose a novel decomposition framework for
the distributed optimization of Difference Convex (DC)-type
nonseparable sum-utility functions subject to coupling convex
constraints. A major contribution of the paper is to develop for
the first time a class of (inexact) best-response-like algorithms
with provable convergence, where a suitably convexified version
of the original DC program is iteratively solved. The main feature
of the proposed successive convex approximation method is its
decomposability structure across the users, which leads naturally
to distributed algorithms in the primal and/or dual domain. The
proposed framework is applicable to a variety of multiuser DC
problems in different areas, ranging from signal processing, to
communications and networking.
As a case study, in the second part of the paper we focus on
two examples, namely: i) a novel resource allocation problem in
the emerging area of cooperative physical layer security; ii) and
the renowned sum-rate maximization of MIMO Cognitive Radio
networks. Our contribution in this context is to devise a class of
easy-to-implement distributed algorithms with provable conver-
gence to stationary solution of such problems. Numerical results
show that the proposed distributed schemes reach performance
close to (and sometimes better than) that of centralized methods.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE resource allocation problem in multiuser systemsgenerally consists of optimizing the (weighted) sum of
the users’ objective functions, also termed a “social function”.
In this paper we address the frequent and difficult case in
which the social function is nonconvex and there are (convex)
shared constraints coupling the strategies of all the users.
Our attention is mainly focused on objective functions of
the DC-type, i.e., the difference of two convex functions.
It is worth mentioning that DC programs are very common
in signal processing, communications, and networking. For
instance, the following resource allocation problems belong to
the class of DC programs: power control problems in cellu-
lar systems [1]–[3]; MIMO relay optimization [4]; dynamic
spectrum management in DSL systems [5], [6]; sum-rate
maximization, proportional-fairness and max-min optimization
of SISO/MISO/MIMO ad-hoc networks [7]–[10].
In the effort of (optimally) solving DC programs, a great
deal of the aforementioned works involves global optimiza-
tion techniques whose solution methods are mainly based
on combinatorial approaches (e.g., adaptations of branch and
bound techniques [11]); the results are a variety of centralized
algorithms customized to the specific DC structure under
considerations [1]–[5]. However, centralized schemes are too
demanding in most applications (e.g., large-scale decentralized
networks). This has motivated a number of works whose effort
has been finding efficiently high quality (generally locally
optimal) solutions of DC programs via easy-to-implement
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distributed algorithms. Distributed ad-hoc schemes (with prov-
able convergence) for very specific DC formulations have been
proposed in [6]–[8], [10], mainly based on Successive Convex
Approximation (SCA) techniques [10], [12], [13]. In these
works however the formulations contain only private con-
straints (i.e., there is no coupling among the users’ strategies).
In this paper, we move a step forward and consider the
more general multiuser DC program, whose feasible set in-
cludes also coupling convex constraints. To the best of our
knowledge, the design of distributed algorithms for this class
of problems is an open issue. Indeed, the nonconvexity of the
social function prevents the application of standard primal/dual
decomposition techniques for convex problems, e.g., [14],
[15]; the presence of coupling constraints makes the distributed
techniques developed in [6]–[8], [10], [12] not directly usable;
and standard SCA methods for DC programs [13] wherein the
concave part of the objective function is linearized would lead
to centralized schemes (because the resulting convex function
is generally not separable in the users’ variables).
A first contribution of this paper is to develop a novel
distributed decomposition method for solving such a class of
multiuser DC problems. Capitalizing on the SCA idea, the
proposed novel technique solves a sequence of strongly convex
subproblems, whose objective function is obtained by diago-
nalization plus off-diagonal linearization of the convex part of
the original DC sum-utility and linearization of the noncon-
vex part. Some desirable features of the proposed approach
are: i) Convergence to a stationary solution of the original
DC programming is guaranteed also if the subproblems are
solved in an inexact way; ii) Each convex subproblem can
be distributively solved by the users capitalizing on standard
primal or dual decomposition techniques; and iii) It leads to
alternative distributed algorithms that differ from rate and ro-
bustness of convergence, scalability, local computation versus
global communication, and quantity of message passing. All
these features make the proposed technique and algorithms
applicable to a variety of networks scenarios and problems.
As a case study, in the second part of the paper we show
how to customize the developed framework to two specific
problems, namely: 1) a novel resource allocation problem in
the emerging area of cooperative physical layer security; and
2) the renowned sum-rate maximization of MIMO Cognitive
Radio (CR) networks. A brief description of our main contri-
butions in these two contexts is given next.
1) Cooperative physical layer security: Physical layer se-
curity has been considered as a promising technique to prevent
illegitimate receivers from eavesdropping on the confiden-
tial message transmitted between intended network nodes;
see, e.g., [16] and references therein. Recently, cooperative
transmissions using trusted relays or friendly jammers to
improve physical layer security has attracted increasing at-
2tention [17]–[24]. Of particular interest to this work is the
Cooperative Jamming (CJ) paradigm (see, e.g., [17]–[19]):
friendly jammers create judicious interference by transmitting
noise (or codewords) so as to impair the eavesdropper’s ability
to decode the confidential information, and thus, increase
secure communication rates between legitimate parties. The
interference from the jammers however might also reduce the
useful rate of the legitimate links; therefore the maximization
of the users’ secrecy rate calls for a joint optimization of the
power allocations of the sources and the jammers.
In this paper we address such a joint optimization prob-
lem. We consider a network model composed of multiple
transmitter-receiver pairs, multiple friendly jammers, and a
single eavesdropper. Note that previous works studied simpler
system models, composed of either one source-destination link
(and possibly multiple jammers) or multiple sources but one
jammer. We formulate the system design as a game wherein
the players−the legitimate users−maximize their own secrecy
rate by choosing jointly their transmit power and (the optimal
fraction of the) power of the friendly jammers. The resulting
secrecy game faces two main challenges, namely: i) the play-
ers’ objective functions are nonconcave and nondifferentiable;
and ii) there are side (thus coupling) constraints. All this
makes the analysis of the proposed game a difficult task; for
instance, a Nash Equilibrium may not even exist. Capitalizing
on recent results on nonconvex games with side constraints
[25], [26], we introduce a novel relaxed equilibrium concept
for the nonconvex nondifferentiable game, named (restricted)
B-Quasi Generalized Nash Equilibrium (B-QGNE). Roughly
speaking a B-QGNE is a solution of the first order aggregated
stationarity conditions (based on directional derivatives) of the
players’ optimization problems. Aiming to devise distributed
algorithms computing a (B-)QGNE, we establish a connection
between (a subclass of) such equilibria and the stationary
solutions of a suitably defined differentiable DC program
with side constraints, for which we can successfully use the
DC framework developed in the first part of the paper. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt toward
a rigorous characterization of the nondifferentiability issue
in secrecy capacity multiuser resource allocation problems.
Numerical experiments show that the proposed distributed
algorithms yield sum-secrecy-rates that are better than those
achievable by centralized schemes (attempting to compute
stationary solutions of the DC program), and comparable
to those achievable by computationally expensive techniques
attempting to obtain globally optimal solutions.
2) MIMO Cognitive Radio design: We consider the sum-
rate maximization of CR MIMO systems, subject to coupling
interference constraints. Special cases of such a nonconvex
problem have been widely studied in the literature. The
analysis is mainly limited to local interference constraints (see
[8], [27] and references therein), with the exception of [7],
[28] where coupling constraints are considered. However the
theoretical convergence of algorithms in [7], [28] is up to date
an open problem. Since the general optimization problem is
an instance of DC programs with shared constraints, we can
apply the framework developed in the paper and obtain for the
first time a class of distributed (primal/dual-based) algorithms
with probable convergence.
In summary, the main contributions of this paper are:
• A novel class of distributed decomposition algorithms with
provable convergence for multiuser DC problems with (con-
vex) side constraints.
• A novel game theoretical formulation for the secrecy rate
maximization problem in multiple source-destination OFDMA
networks with multiple friendly jammers, and consequent
algorithms to compute its QGNE based on a nontrivial DC
reformulation of the game.
• A class of provable convergent distributed primal/dual
algorithms for the CR MIMO sum-rate maximization problem.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the proposed multiuser DC problem with coupling
constraints. Section III presents a novel decomposition tech-
nique for computing stationary solutions of the DC problem,
which is suitable for a distributed implementation. Distributed
algorithms building on primal and dual decomposition tech-
niques are discussed in Section IV. Section V customizes the
proposed framework to the cooperative physical layer security
game and the CR MIMO sum-rate maximization problem.
Finally, Section VI draws some conclusions.
II. MULTIUSER DC-PROGRAM WITH SIDE CONSTRAINTS
We consider a multiuser system composed of I coupled
users. Each user i makes decision on his ni-dimensional real
strategy vector xi ∈ Rni , subject to some local constraints
given by the set Xi ⊂ Rni . The joint strategy set is denoted
by X , ∏Ii=1 Xi; x−i , (xj)j 6=i is the strategy vector of
all users except user i; X−i ,
∏
j 6=i Xj ; and x , (xi)Ii=1
denotes the strategy profile of all the users. In addition to the
private constraints, there are also side constraints in the form
of a nc-vector function h(x) , (hj(x))ncj=1 ≤ 0. The system
design is formulated as a DC program in the following form:
minimize
x
θ(x) ,
I∑
i=1
(fi(x) − gi(x))
subject to xi ∈ Xi ∀ i = 1, . . . , I (private constraints)
h(x) ≤ 0 (coupling constraints).
(1)
Assumptions. We make the following blanket assumptions:
A1) The functions fi, gi for i = 1, . . . , I , and hj for j =
1, . . . , nc, are convex and continuously differentiable on X ;
A2) Each set Xi is (nonempty) closed and convex;
A3) The functions fi and gi have Lipschitz continuous
gradients on Ξ with constant L∇fi and L∇gi , respectively;
where Ξ denotes the convex feasible set of (1); let L∇θ ,∑
i L∇fi +
∑
i L∇gi .
A4) The lower level set L(x0) , {x ∈ Ξ | θ(x) ≤ θ(x0)} of
the objective function θ is compact for some x0 ∈ Ξ;
A5) The convex coupling constraints are in the separable form:
h(x) ,
∑I
i=1 hi(xi) ≤ 0.
The assumptions above are quite standard and are satisfied
by a large class of practical problems. For instance, A4
guarantees that (1) has a solution even when Ξ is not bounded;
of course A4 is trivially satisfied if Ξ is bounded.
Instances of problem (1) appear in many applications, from
signal processing to communications and networking; see
3Sec. V for some motivating examples. Our goal is to obtain
distributed best-response-like algorithms for the class of prob-
lems (1), converging to stationary solutions. This confronts
three major challenges, namely: i) the objective function is
the sum of differences of two convex functions, and thus in
general nonconvex; ii) the objective function is not separable
in the users’ strategies (each function fi and gi depends on the
strategy profile x of all users); and iii) there are side constraints
coupling all the optimization variables. We deal with these
issues in the following sections.
III. A NEW BEST-RESPONSE SCA DECOMPOSITION
The standard SCA-based technique for DC programs ap-
plied to (1) would suggest solving a sequence of convex
subproblems whose objective function is obtained by lin-
earizing at the current iterate the nonconvex part of θ(x),
that is
∑
i gi(x), while retaining the convex part
∑
i fi(x);
see, e.g., [12], [13]. However, because of the nonseparability
of the aforementioned terms, the resulting convexification
does not enjoy a decomposable structure; therefore such SCA
techniques will lead to centralized solution methods.
Here we introduce a new decomposition technique that
does not suffer from this drawback. To formally describe our
approach, let us start rewriting each function fi(x) as: given
xν and denoting xν−i ,
(
xνj
)
j 6=i
, we have
fi(x) = fi(xi,x
ν
−i) +
[
fi(xi,x−i)− fi(xi,xν−i)
]
. (2)
We now approximate the term in brackets using a first order
Taylor expansion at xν ,
fi(xi,x−i)− fi(xi,xν−i) ≈
∑
j 6=i
∇xjfi(xν)T (xj − xνj ),
and approximate (2) as
fi(x) ≈ f˜i(x;xν) , fi(xi,xν−i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
diagonalization
+
∑
j 6=i
∇xjfi(xν)T (xj − xνj )︸ ︷︷ ︸
off-diagonal linearization
(3)
yielding a diagonalization plus off-diagonal linearization of
fi(x) at xν . To deal with the nonconvexity of −gi(x), we
replace the functions gi(x) with its linearization at xν :
gi(x) ≈ g˜i(x;xν) , gi(xν) +
I∑
j=1
∇xjgi(xν)T (xj − xνj )︸ ︷︷ ︸
linearization
.
(4)
Based on (3) and (4), the candidate approximation of the
nonconvex sum-utility θ(x) at xν is:
θ˜(x;xν ) ,
I∑
i=1
(
f˜i(x;x
ν)− g˜i(x;xν )
)
+
I∑
i=1
τi
2
‖xi − xνi ‖2,
(5)
where we added a proximal-like regularization term with
τi ≥ 0, whose numerical benefits are well-understood; see,
e.g., [14]. Rearranging the terms in the above sum, it is not
difficult to see that (5) can be equivalently rewritten as
θ˜(x;xν) =
I∑
i=1
θ˜i(xi;x
ν), (6)
where
θ˜i(xi;x
ν) ,
fi(xi,xν−i) +∑
j 6=i
∇xifj(xν)T (xi − xνi )

−
gi(xν) + I∑
j=1
∇xigj(xν)T (xi − xνi )
+ τi
2
‖xi − xνi ‖2.
(7)
Roughly speaking, the main idea behind the above approx-
imations is to use a proper combination of diagonalization
and partial linearization on the convex functions fi(x) [cf.
(3)] together with a linearization of the nonconvex terms
gi(x) [cf. (4)]. The diagonalization procedure fixes the non-
separability issue in θ(x) while preserving the convex part
in θ(x), whereas the linearization of gi(x) gets rid of the
nonconvex part in θ(x). Indeed, this procedure leads to the
approximation function θ˜(x;xν ) at xν that is separable in the
users’ variables xi [each θ˜i(xi;xν) depends only on xi, given
xν] and is strongly convex in x ∈ Ξ.
The proposed SCA decomposition consists then in solving
iteratively (possibly with a memory) the following sequence
of (strongly) convex optimization problems: given xν ∈ Ξ,
x̂ (xν) , argmin
x∈Ξ
θ˜(x;xν ). (8)
The formal description of the proposed SCA technique is given
in Algorithm 1. Note that in Step 3 of the algorithm we allow a
memory in the update of the iterate xν in the form of a convex
combination via γν ∈ (0, 1] (this guarantees xν+1 ∈ Ξ).
Algorithm 1: SCA Algorithm for the DC program (1)
Data: τ , (τi)Ii=1 ≥ 0, {γν} > 0 and x0 ∈ Ξ. Set ν = 0.
(S.1): If xν satisfies a termination criterion, STOP;
(S.2): Compute x̂ (xν) [cf. (8)];
(S.3): Set xν+1 , xν + γν ( x̂ (xν)− xν );
(S.4): ν ← ν + 1 and go to (S.1).
The convergence of the algorithm is studied in the next
theorem, where cfi(x−i) ≥ 0 in (10) is the largest constant
such that (zi − wi)T (∇xifi(zi,x−i) − ∇xifi(wi,x−i)) ≥
cfi(x−i)‖zi −wi‖2, for all zi,wi ∈ Xi and x−i ∈ X−i.
Theorem 1. Given the DC program (1) under A1-A4, suppose
that τ , (τi)Ii=1 and {γν} are chosen so that one of the two
following conditions are satisfied:
(a) Constant step-size rule:
γν = γ ∈ (0, 1] ∀ ν ≥ 0 and 2 cτ > γL∇θ. (9)
with
cτ , min
i=1,...,I
{
τi + inf
z
−i∈X−i
cfi(z−i)
}
. (10)
(b) Diminishing step-size rule:
cτ > 0, γ
ν ∈ (0, 1], γν → 0, and ∑∞ν=0 γν = +∞. (11)
Then, the sequence {xν} generated by Algorithm 1 con-
verges in a finite number of iterations to a stationary point
of (1) or every limit point of the sequence (at least one such
point exists) is a stationary solution of (1).
Proof: See Appendix A.
4Remark 1 (On Algorithm 1). The algorithm implements a
novel SCA decomposition technique: at each iteration ν, a sep-
arable (strongly) convex function θ˜(x;xν) is minimized over
the convex set Ξ. The main difference from the classical SCA
techniques (e.g., [11]–[13]) is that the approximation function
θ˜(x;xν ) is separable across the users. In Section IV, we show
that such a structure leads naturally to a distributed implemen-
tation of Algorithm 1. A practical termination criterion in Step
1 is to stop the iterates when |θ(xν)− θ(xν−1)| ≤ δ, where δ
is a prescribed accuracy. Finally, it is reasonable to expect the
algorithm to perform better than classical gradient algorithms
applied directly to (1) at the cost of no extra signaling, because
the structure of the objective function θ(x) is better explored.
Remark 2 (On the choice of the free parameters). Theorem
1 offers some flexibility in the choice of τ and γν , while
guaranteeing convergence of Algorithm 1, which makes it
applicable in a variety of scenarios. More specifically, one
can use a constant or a diminishing rule for the step-size γν .
Constant step-size rule: This rule resembles analogous con-
stant step-size rules in gradient algorithms: convergence is
guaranteed either under “sufficiently” small step-size γ (given
τ ) or “sufficiently” large τi’s (given γ ∈ (0, 1]), such that (9)
is satisfied. A special case that is worth mentioning is: γ = 1
and 2 cτ > γL∇θ, which leads to a SCA-based iterate with
no memory: given xν ∈ Ξ, xν+1 , x̂ (xν). In this particular
case, we can relax a bit the convergence condition (9) and
require the Lipschitz continuity of the gradients of fi only.
The result is stated next (see attached material for the proof).
Theorem 2. Let {xν} be the sequence generated by Algorithm
1, in the setting of Theorem 1 where however we relax A3 by
assuming that fi have Lipschitz gradients with constants L∇fi .
Suppose that γν = 1 and τ > 0 is such that τmin , mini τi >
2
∑I
i=1 L∇fi; then, the conclusions of Theorem 1 hold.
Diminishing step-size rule: The application of a constant step-
size rule requires the knowledge of the Lipschitz constants
L∇fi and L∇gi , which may not be available. One can use
a (conservative) estimate of such values (e.g., using upper
bounds), but in practice this generally leads to “large” val-
ues of cτ satisfying (9), which reasonably slows down the
algorithm. In all these situations, a valid alternative is to use a
diminishing step-size in the form (11); examples of such rules
are [10]: given γ0 = 1,
Rule 1: γν = γν−1
(
1− ǫ γν−1) , ν = 1, . . . , (12)
Rule 2: γν = γ
ν−1+β1
1+β2ν
, ν = 1, . . . , (13)
where ǫ ∈ (0, 1) and β1, β2 ∈ (0, 1) are given constants such
that β1 ≤ β2.
A. Inexact implementation of x̂ (xν)
We can reduce the computational effort of Algorithm 1 by
allowing inexact computations of the solution x̂ (xν). The
convergence of the resulting algorithm is still guaranteed
under more stringent conditions on the step-size and some
requirements on the computational errors. The inexact version
of Algorithm 1 is formally described in Algorithm 2 below,
where Step 2 of Algorithm 1, the exact computation of x̂ (xν),
is replaced now with its inexact version, that is find a zν such
that ‖zν − x̂ (xν) ‖ ≤ εν , with εν being the accuracy in the
computation of x̂ (xν) at iteration ν.
Algorithm 2: Inexact version of Algorithm 1
Data: τ ≥ 0, {γν} > 0, {εν} ↓ 0, and x0 ∈ Ξ. Set ν = 0.
(S.1): If xν satisfies a termination criterion, STOP;
(S.2): Find a zν such that ‖zν − x̂ (xν) ‖ ≤ εν ;
(S.3): Set xν+1 , xν + γν ( zν − xν );
(S.4): ν ← ν + 1 and go to (S.1).
Convergence is guaranteed if the error sequence {εν} and
the step-size {γν} are properly chosen, as stated in Theorem
3. The proof of this result is based on the application of
Proposition 4 (cf. Appendix A) and [10, Th. 4], and is omitted.
Theorem 3. Let {xν} be the sequence generated by Algo-
rithm 2 in the setting of Theorem 1, where however A4 is
strengthened by assuming that θ is coercive on Ξ. Suppose
that {γν} and {εν} are chosen so that the following conditions
are satisfied: i) γν ∈ (0, 1]; ii) γν → 0; iii) ∑∞ν=0 γν = +∞;
iv) ∑∞ν=0 (γν)2 < +∞; and v) ∑∞ν=0 εν γν < +∞. Then,
conclusions of Theorem 1 hold.
Note that the steps-size rule in (12) satisfies the square
summability condition in Theorem 3. As expected, in the
presence of errors, convergence of Algorithm 2 is guaranteed if
εν → 0, meaning that the sequence of approximated problems
(8) is solved with increasing accuracy. Note that Theorem 3v)
imposes also a constraint on the rate by which εν goes to
zero, which depends also on {γν}. An example of an error
sequence satisfying condition v) is εν ≤ αγν , where α is any
finite positive constant. Interestingly, such a condition can be
enforced in Algorithm 2 using classical error bound results in
convex analysis; see, e.g., [29, Ch. 6]. Two examples of error
bounds are given in Lemma 1 below, where we introduced the
following residual quantities:
rΞ(z;x
ν) ,
∥∥∥ΠN (z,Ξ)(−∇xθ˜(z;xν)) +∇xθ˜(z;xν)∥∥∥
lΞ(z;x
ν) ,
∥∥∥z−ΠΞ (z−∇xθ˜(z;xν))∥∥∥
with ΠN (z,Ξ)(y) [resp. ΠΞ(y)] denoting the Euclidean pro-
jection of y onto the normal cone N (z,Ξ) , {y ∈ Rn :
yT (x− z) ≤ 0, ∀x ∈ Ξ} (resp. Ξ). The proof of Lemma 1 is
similar to that of [29, Prop. 6.3.1, Prop. 6.3.7] and is omitted.1
Lemma 1. Given the optimization problem (8) under assump-
tions A1-A4, the following hold:
(a): A (finite) constant ξ1 > 0 exists such that
‖z− x̂ (xν) ‖ ≤ ξ1 rΞ(z;xν ), z ∈ Ξ;
(b): A (finite) constant ξ2 > 0 exists such that
‖z− x̂ (xν) ‖ ≤ ξ2 lΞ(z;xν), z ∈ Rn.
Note that, for a non-polyhedral finitely representable (con-
vex) set Ξ and z, the computation of lΞ(z;xν) amounts to
solving a convex optimization problem; whereas in the same
1As a technical note, referring to [29, Prop. 6.3.1, Prop. 6.3.7] and
using the same notation therein, we just observe here that the proof of
the aforementioned propositions can be easily extended to the case of non-
Cartesian set K but strongly monotone VI functions F.
5case if z ∈ Ξ satisfies a suitable Constraint Qualification (CQ),
the computation of rΞ(z;xν) reduces to solving a convex
quadratic program. Thus rΞ(z;xν) is computationally easier
than lΞ(z;xν) to be obtained but, contrary to lΞ(z;xν ), it
can be used only to test vectors z belonging to Ξ. Using the
error bounds in Lemma 1 and given a step-size rule {γν}, the
termination criterion in Step 2 of the algorithm becomes then
rΞ(z;x
ν ) ≤ α˜ γν or lΞ(z;xν) ≤ α˜ γν , for some α˜ > 0.
B. Generalizations
So far we have restricted our attention to optimization
problems in the DC form. However, it is worth mentioning that
the proposed analysis and resulting algorithms (also those in-
troduced in the forthcoming sections) can be readily extended
to other sum-utility functions not necessarily in the DC form,
such as θ̂(x) ,
∑
ℓ∈If
fℓ(x), where the set If , {1, . . . , If}
may be different from the set of users {1, . . . , I}, and each
function fℓ is not necessarily expressed as the difference of
two convex functions. It is not difficult to show that in such
a case the candidate approximation function θ˜(x;xν ) still has
the form in (6), where each θ˜i(x;xν) is now given by
θ˜i(x;x
ν) ,
∑
j∈Ci
fj(xi, x
ν
−i) +
∑
j /∈Ci
∇xifj(xν)T (xi − xνi )
+
τi
2
‖xi − xνi ‖2
where Ci is any subset of Si ⊆ If , with
Si , {j ∈ If :fj(•,x−i) is convex on Xi, ∀x−i ∈ X−i}.
In θ˜i(x;xν) each user linearizes only the functions outside
Ci while preserving the convex part of the sum-utility. The
choice of Ci ⊆ Si is a degree of freedom useful to explore
the tradeoff between signaling and convergence speed. We
omit further details because of space limitation.
IV. DISTRIBUTED IMPLEMENTATION
In general, the implementation of Algorithms 1 and 2 re-
quires a coordination among the users; the amount of network
signaling depends on the specific application under considera-
tion. To alleviate the communication overhead of a centralized
implementation, it is desirable to obtain a decentralized version
of these schemes. Interestingly, the separability structure of the
approximation function θ˜(x;xν) resulting from the proposed
convexification method (cf. Sec. III) as well as that of the
coupling constraints lends itself to a parallel decomposition
of the subproblems (8) across the users in the primal or dual
domain. The proposed distributed implementations of Step 2
of Algorithms 1 (and Algorithm 2) are described in the next
two subsections.
A. Distributed dual-decomposition based algorithms
The subproblems (8) can be solved in a distributed way
if the side constraints h(x) ≤ 0 are dualized (under zero-
duality gap). The dual problem associated with each (8) is:
given xν ∈ Ξ,
maximize
λ≥0
{
d(λ;xν) , minimize
x∈X
{
θ˜(x;xν) + λTh(x)
}}
.
(14)
Note that, under A1-A4, the inner minimization in (14) has
a unique solution, which will be denoted by x̂(λ;xν) ,
(x̂i(λ;x
ν))Ii=1, that is
x̂i(λ;x
ν) , argmin
xi∈Xi
{
θ˜i(xi;x
ν) + λThi(xi)
}
. (15)
Before proceeding, let us introduce the following assumptions.
Assumptions A5-A6: A5) The side constraint vector function
h(•) is Lipschitz continuous on X , with constant Lh;
A6) For each subproblem (8), there is zero-duality gap, and
the dual problem (14) has a non-empty solution set.
We emphasize that the above conditions are generally
satisfied by many practical problems of interest. For example,
we have zero duality gap if some CQ is satisfied, e.g.,
(generalized) Slater’s CQ, or the feasible set Ξ is a polyhedron.
The next lemma summarizes some desirable properties of
the dual function d(λ;xν), which are instrumental to prove
convergence of dual schemes.
Lemma 2. Under A1-A4 we have the following:
(a): d(λ;xν) is differentiable on Rnc+ , with gradient
∇λd(λ;xν) = h (x̂(λ;xν)) =
∑
i
hi (x̂i(λ;x
ν)) . (16)
(b): If, in addition, A5 holds, then ∇λd(λ;xν) is Lipschitz
continuous on Rnc+ with constant L∇d , L2h
√
nc/cτ .
Proof: See attached material.
The dual-problem can be solved, e.g., using well-known
gradient algorithms [30]; an instance is given in Algorithm
3, whose convergence is stated in Theorem 4 (whose proof
follows from Lemma 2 and standard convergence results of
gradient projection algorithms [30]). In (17) [•]+ denotes the
Euclidean projection onto R+, i.e., [x]+ , max(0, x).
Algorithm 3: Dual-based Distributed Implementation of Step
2 of Algorithm 1
Data: λ0 ≥ 0, xν , {αt} > 0; set t = 0.
(S.2a): If λt satisfies a suitable termination criterion: STOP.
(S.2b): The users solve in parallel (15): for all i = 1, . . . , I ,
compute x̂i(λt;xν)
(S.2c): Update λ according to
λt+1 ,
[
λt + αt
I∑
i=1
hi
(
x̂i(λ
t;xν)
)]
+
. (17)
(S.2d): t← t+ 1 and go back to (S.2a).
Theorem 4. Given the DC program (1) under A1-A4, suppose
that one of the two following conditions are satisfied:
(a): A5 holds and {αt} is chosen such that 0 < αt = αmax <
2/L∇d, for all t ≥ 0;
(b): ∇λd(•;xν) is uniformly bounded on Rnc+ , and {αt}
is chosen such that αt > 0, αt → 0, ∑t αt = ∞, and∑
t(α
t)2 <∞.
Then, the sequence {λt} generated by Algorithm 3 con-
verges to a solution of (14). If, in addition, A6 holds, the
sequence {x̂(λt;xν)} converges to the unique solution of (8).
Remark 3 (On the distributed implementation). The dis-
tributed implementation of Algorithms 1 and 2 based on
6Algorithm 3 leads to a double-loop scheme with communi-
cation between the two loops: given the current value of the
multipliers λt, the users can solve in a distributed way their
subproblems (15); once the new value x̂(λt;xν) is available,
the multipliers are updated according to (17). Note that when
nc = 1 (i.e., only one shared constraint), the update in (17) can
be replaced by a bisection search, which generally converges
quite fast. When nc > 1, the potential slow convergence
of gradient updates (17) can be alleviated using accelerated
gradient-based update; see, e.g., [31]. Note also that the size
of the dual problem (the dimension of λ) is equal to nc
(the number of shared constraints), which makes Algorithm
3 scalable in the number of users.
As far as the communication overhead needed to implement
the proposed scheme is concerned, the signaling among the
users is in the form of message passing and, of course, is
problem dependent; see Sec. V for specific examples. When
the networks has a cluster-head, the update of the multipliers
can be performed at the cluster, and then broadcast to the users.
In fully decentralized networks, the update of λ can be done by
the users themselves, by running consensus based algorithms
to locally estimate
∑
i hi (x̂i(λ
t;xν)). This in general requires
a limited signaling exchange among neighboring nodes.
B. Distributed implementation via primal-decomposition
Algorithm 3 is based on the relaxation of the side constraints
into the Lagrangian, resulting in general in a violation of
these constraints during the intermediate iterates. In some
applications, this may prevent the on-line implementation of
the algorithm. In this section, we propose a distributed scheme
which does not suffer from this issue; we cope with side
constraints using a primal decomposition technique.
Introducing the slack variables t , (ti)Ii=1, with each ti ∈
Rnc , (8) can be rewritten as
minimize
(xi,ti)Ii=1
∑I
i=1 θ˜i(xi;x
ν),
subject to xi ∈ Xi, ∀i = 1, . . . , I,
hi(xi) ≤ ti, ∀i = 1, . . . , I,∑I
i=1 ti ≤ 0,
(18)
When t = (ti)Ii=1 is fixed, (18) can be decoupled across the
users: for each i = 1, . . . , I , solve
minimize
xi
θ˜i(xi;x
ν),
subject to xi ∈ Xi,
hi(xi)
µi(ti;x
ν)
≤ ti,
(19)
where µi(ti;xν) is the optimal Lagrange multiplier associated
with the inequality constraint hi(xi) ≤ ti. Note that the
existence of µi(ti;xν) is guaranteed if (19) has zero duality
gap (e.g., when some CQ hold), but µi(ti;xν) may not be
unique. Let us denote by x⋆i (ti;xν) the unique solution of
(19), given t =(ti)Ii=1. The optimal slack t⋆ , (t⋆i )Ii=1 of the
shared constraints can be found solving the so-called master
(convex) problem (see, e.g., [15]):
minimize
t
P (t;xν) ,
∑I
i=1 θ˜i(x
⋆
i (ti;x
ν);xν)
subject to ∑Ii=1 ti ≤ 0. (20)
Due to the non-uniqueness of µi(ti;xν), the objective function
in (20) is nondifferentiable; problem (20) can be solved by
subgradient methods. The subgradient of P (t;xν) at t is
∂tiP (t;x
ν) = −µi(ti;xν), i = 1, . . . , I.
We refer to [30, Prop. 8.2.6] for standard convergence results
of sub-gradient projection algorithms.
V. APPLICATIONS AND NUMERICAL RESULTS
The DC formulation (1) and the consequent proposed al-
gorithms are general enough to encompass many problems
of practical interest in different fields. Because of the space
limitation, here we focus only on two specific applications that
can be casted in the DC-form (1), namely: i) a new secrecy
rate maximization game; and ii) the sum-rate maximization
problem over MIMO CR networks.
A. Case Study #1: A new secrecy rate game
1) System model and problem formulation: Consider a
wireless communication system composed of Q transmitter-
receiver pairs−the legitimate users−J friendly jammers, and
a single eavesdropper. We assume OFDMA transmissions for
the legitimate users over flat-fading and quasi-static (constant
within the transmission frame) channels. We denote by HSDqq
the channel gain of the legitimate source-destination pair q,
by HJDjq the channel gain between jammer j and the receiver
of user q, by HJEje the channel gain between the transmitter
of jammer j and the receiver of the eavesdropper, and by
HSEqe the channel between the source q and the eavesdropper.
We assume CSI of the eavesdropper’s (cross-)channels; this
is a common assumption in PHY security literature; see,
e.g., [16]–[24]. CSI on the eavesdropper’s channel can be
obtained when the eavesdropper is active in the network and
its transmissions can be monitored. For instance, this happens
in networks combining multicast and unicast transmissions
wherein the users work as legitimate receiver for some signals
and eavesdroppers for others. Another scenario is a cellular
environment where the eavesdroppers are also users of the
network; in a time-division duplex system, the base station
can estimate users’ channels based on the channel reciprocity.
In the setting above, we adopt the CJ paradigm: the friendly
jammers cooperate with the users by introducing a proper
interference profile “masking” the eavesdropper. The (uniform)
power allocation of source q is denoted by pq; pJjq is the
fraction of power of friendly jammer j requested by user q
(allocated by jammer j over the channel used by user q); the
power profile allocated by all the jammers over the channel
of user q is pJq , (pJjq)Jj=1. Each user q has power budget
pq ≤ Pq , and likewise each jammer j, that is ∑Qq=1 pJjq ≤ P Jj ,
for all j = 1, . . . , J . Under basic information theoretical
assumptions, the maximum achievable rate on link q is
rqq
(
pq,p
J
q
)
, log
(
1 +
HSDqq pq
σ2 +
∑J
j=1H
JD
jq p
J
jq
)
. (21)
Similarly, the rate on the channel between source q and the
eavesdropper is
rqe
(
pq,p
J
q
)
, log
(
1 +
HSEqe pq
σ2 +
∑J
j=1H
JE
je p
J
jq
)
. (22)
7The secrecy rate of user q is then (see, e.g., [16]):
rsq
(
pq,p
J
q
)
,
[
rqq(pq,p
J
q) − rqe(pq,pJq)
]
+
. (23)
Problem formulation: We formulate the system design as a
game where the legitimate users are the players who cooperate
with the jammers to maximize their own secrecy rate. More
formally, anticipating (pJr)r 6=q, each user q seeks together
with the jammers the tuple (pq,pJq) solving the following
optimization problem:
G :
maximize
(pq,pJq)≥0
rsq
(
pq,p
J
q
)
subject to: pq ≤ Pq,∑Q
r=1 p
J
jr ≤ P Jj , ∀ j = 1, . . . , J.
}
,Pq(pJ−q)
(24)
Note that the feasible set Pq(pJ−q) of (24) depends on the
jammers’ power profile pJ−q , (pJr)r 6=q allocated over the
other users’ channels. When needed, we will denote each
tuple (pq,pJq) by xq , (pq,pJq). The above game whose q-
th optimization problem is given by (24) will be termed as
secrecy game G.
The secrecy game G is an instance of the so-called Gen-
eralized Nash Equilibrium problem (GNEP) with shared con-
straints; see, e.g., [32]. A solution of G is the Generalized
Nash Equilibrium (GNE), defined as follows.
Definition 1 (GNE). A strategy profile (p⋆q ,pJ⋆q )Qq=1 is a GNE
of the GNEP G if the following holds for all q = 1, . . . , Q:
(p⋆q ,p
J⋆
q ) ∈ Pq(pJ⋆−q) and
rsq(p
⋆
q ,p
J⋆
q ) ≥ rsq(pq,pJq), ∀(pq,pJq) ∈ Pq(pJ⋆−q). (25)
The (distributed) computation of a GNE of G is a chal-
lenging if not an impossible task, due to the following issues:
1) the non-differentiability of the player’s objective functions;
2) the non-concavity of the players’ objective functions; and
3) the presence of coupling constraints. Toward the practical
resolution of G coping with the aforementioned issues, we
follow the three logical steps outlined next.
−A smooth-game formulation: We start dealing with the
nondifferentiability issue by introducing a smooth restricted
(still nonconcave) version of the original game G, termed game
Gsm, and establishing the connection with G in terms of GNE;
−Relaxed equilibrium concepts: To deal with the nonconcavity
of the players’ objective functions we introduce relaxed equi-
librium concepts for both games G and Gsm, and establish their
connections. The comparison shows that the smooth game Gsm
preserves (relaxed) solutions of G of practical interest while
just ignoring those yielding zero secrecy rates for the players.
−Algorithmic design: We then focus on the computation of the
relaxed equilibria of Gsm, casting the problem into a multiuser
DC program in the form (1), which can be distributively solved
using the machinery introduced in the first part of the paper.
2) A smooth-game formulation: We introduce a restricted
smooth-game wherein the max operator in the objective func-
tion of each player’s optimization problem (24) is relaxed via
linear constraints. This formulation is a direct consequence of
the following fact: rqq
(
pq,p
J
q
) ≥ rqe (pq,pJq) if and only if
either pq = 0 or
HSDqq
σ2 +
∑J
j=1H
JD
jq p
J
jq
≥ H
SE
qe
σ2 +
∑J
j=1H
JE
je p
J
jq
.
Clearly, the latter inequality is equivalent to:
J∑
j=1
(
HSDqqH
JE
je −HSEqeHJDjq
)
pJjq+
(
HSDqq −HSEqe
)
σ2 ≥ 0. (26)
Note that if (26) holds with equality, then rsq
(
pq,p
J
q
)
= 0
for any pq ≥ 0. These observations lead to the following
restricted smooth game, which we call Gsm, where each
player q anticipating pJ−q solves the following smooth, albeit
nonconcave, maximization problem:
Gsm :
maximize
(pq ,pJq)≥0
r˜sq(pq,p
J
q) , rqq(pq,p
J
q) − rqe(pq,pJq)
subject to: pq ≤ Pq,
constraint (26),∑Q
r=1 p
J
jr ≤ P Jj , ∀ j = 1, . . . , J,
,Psmq (pJ−q)
(27)
where we denoted by P smq (pJ−q) the feasible set of the
optimization problem. For notational convenience, we also
introduce the joint strategy set P defined as: P ,(pq,p
J
q))
Q
q=1 ≥ 0 : pq ≤ Pq and (26) holds, ∀q = 1, . . . , Q,∑Q
r=1
pJjr ≤ P Jj , ∀ j = 1, . . . , J

(28)
It turns out from the above discussion that, solution-wise,
the main difference between the smooth game Gsm and the
original one G is that Gsm ignores the feasible players’ strategy
profiles of G violating (26) (and thus outside P). But such
tuples yield zero secrecy rate of the players and thus are of
little significance, since the players’ goals are to attempt the
maximization of their secrecy rates. We can then focus on
strategy profiles in the set P , without any practical loss of
optimality. The next proposition makes formal the aforemen-
tioned connection between G and Gsm.
Proposition 1. Given G and Gsm, the following hold.
(a) A GNE of G always exists;
(b) A GNE of Gsm exists provided that P 6= ∅;
(c)[G → Gsm]: If x⋆ is a GNE of G satisfying the constraints
(26) for all q = 1, . . . , Q, then x⋆ is a GNE of Gsm.
(d)[Gsm → G]: If x⋆ is a GNE of Gsm, then x⋆ is a GNE of G.
Proof: See Appendix B.
The first important result stated in Proposition 1 is that the
two games have a solution (Gsm under P 6= ∅). Note that a
sufficient condition guaranteeing P 6= ∅ is HSDqq ≥ HSEqe for all
q [cf. (26)], implying that the channel gains of the legitimate
users cannot be worse than those between the sources and
the eavesdropper. For instance, this happens if the legitimate
receivers are much closer to their intended transmitters than
the eavesdropper’s receiver. Conversely, if (26) is violated for
some q (implying P = ∅), there exists no feasible user/jammer
power allocation yielding a positive secrecy rate for user q.
Note that this is in agreement with current results in the
literature; see, e.g., [21], [22].
Proposition 1 also establishes the connection between the
GNE of G and Gsm. In particular, statement (d) justifies the
focus on the smooth (and thus more affordable) game Gsm
8rather than the nonsmooth G without any practical loss of
generality. The computation of a GNE of Gsm however remains
a difficult task, because of the nonconcavity of the players’
objective functions r˜sq . To obtain practical solution schemes,
we introduce next a relaxed equilibrium concept, whose com-
putation can be done using the framework developed in the
first part of the paper.
3) Relaxed equilibrium concepts: Based on the concept of
B(ouligand)-derivative [29] we define next a relaxed notion of
equilibrium for the nonsmooth nonconvex game G.
Definition 2 (B-QGNE). A strategy profile x⋆ , (x⋆q ,
(p⋆q ,p
J⋆
q ))
Q
q=1 is a B-Quasi GNE (B-QGNE) of G if the
following holds for all q = 1, . . . , Q: (p⋆q ,pJ⋆q ) ∈ Pq(pJ⋆−q)
and
rsq
′(x⋆q ;xq − x⋆q) ≤ 0 ∀xq ∈ Pq(pJ⋆−q), (29)
where rsq ′(x⋆q ;xq − x⋆q) denotes the directional derivative of
the function rsq at x⋆q along the direction xq − x⋆q .
In words, a B-QGNE is a stationary solution of the GNEP,
where the stationary concept is based on the directional
derivative. Of course the B-QGNE can be defined also for the
smooth game Gsm; in such a case, the directional derivative
rsq
′(x⋆q ;xq − x⋆q) in (29) reduces to ∇xq r˜sq(x⋆q)T (xq − x⋆q),
because r˜sq(•) is differentiable; thus, in the following, we will
refer to it just as QGNE of Gsm. Note that the B-QGNE is an
instance of the Quasi-Nash Equilibrium introduced recently
in [25], [26] to deal with the nonconvexity of the players’
optimization problems.
It is worth mentioning that since the players’ optimization
problems in G and Gsm have polyhedral feasible sets, every
GNE of G (resp. Gsm) is a B-QGNE (resp. QGNE), but the
converse is not necessarily true.
As already observed for the GNE, the subclass of quasi-
solutions of G of practical interest are those associated with
the strategy profiles belonging to the set P . We can capture
this feature introducing the concept of restricted B-QGNE of
G, which are B-QGNE “over the set P”, ignoring thus all
feasible tuples of (24) that yield zero secrecy rates.
Definition 3 (Restricted B-QGNE). A strategy profile (x⋆q ,
(p⋆q ,p
J⋆
q ))
Q
q=1 is a restricted B-GGNE of G if the following
holds for all q = 1, . . . , Q: (p⋆q ,pJ⋆q ) ∈ Pq(pJ⋆−q) and
rsq
′(x⋆q ;xq − x⋆q) ≤ 0, ∀xq ∈ Psmq (pJ⋆−q),
with Psmq (pJ⋆−q) defined in (27).
A natural question now is whether the connection between
the GNE of G and Gsm as stated in Proposition 1 is somehow
preserved also in terms of quasi-equilibria (which in principle
is not guaranteed). The answer is stated next.
Proposition 2. Given G and Gsm, the following hold.
(a) A B-QGNE of G always exists;
(b) A QGNE of Gsm (resp. restricted B-QGNE of G) exists
provided that P 6= ∅;
(c) [G → Gsm]: If x⋆ is a (restricted) B-QGNE of G satisfying
(26) for all q = 1, . . . , Q, then x⋆ is a QGNE of Gsm;
(d) [Gsm → G]: If x⋆ is a QGNE of Gsm , then x⋆ is a restricted
B-QGNE of G.
Fig. 1: Connections between the games G, Gsm and the social problem (P).
Proof: See Appendix C.
The above proposition paves the way to the design of
numerical methods to compute a B-QGNE of G. Indeed,
according to statement (d), one can compute a B-QGNE of
G (which is a solutions of practical interest) via a QGNE of
Gsm. This last task is addressed in the next subsection.
4) Algorithmic design: With the goal of computing a
QGNE of Gsm in mind, we capitalize on the potential struc-
ture of Gsm and construct the following multiplayer linearly
constrained optimization problem:
(P) :
maximize
(p,pJ)
r(p,pJ) ,
∑Q
q=1
r˜sq(xq)
subject to (p,pJ) ∈ P (30)
The above nonconcave maximization problem is smooth, thus
the standard definition of stationary solutions is applicable.
The connection between the social problem (P) in (30) and
the games G and Gsm is given in the next proposition.
Proposition 3. Given Gsm, and the social problem (P) in (30),
the following hold.
(a) If P 6= ∅, then (P) has an optimal solution;
(b) [(P )→ Gsm]: If x⋆ is an optimal solution of (P), then x⋆
is a GNE of Gsm;
(c) [(P )→ Gsm]: If x⋆ is a stationary solution of (P), then x⋆
is a QGNE of Gsm;
(d) [Gsm → (P )]: If x⋆ is a QGNE of Gsm and there exists
common multipliers of the shared constraints ∑Qr=1 pJjr ≤
P Jj j = 1, . . . , J for all players, then x⋆ is a stationary
solution of (P).
Proof: See attached material.
Figure 1 summarizes the main results and relationship
between G, Gsm and the social problem (P), as stated in
Propositions 1, 2 and 3.
Based on Proposition 3, one can now design distributed al-
gorithms for computing a (Q)GNE of Gsm (and thus a restricted
B-QGNE of the original game G): it is sufficient to solve the
social problem (P). Such a problem is nonconvex; stationary
solutions however can be computed efficiently observing that
(P) is an instance of the DC program (1), under the following
identifications:
fq
(
pq,p
J
q
)
,− log
(
σ2 +HSDqq pq +
∑J
j=1H
JD
jq p
J
jq
)
− log
(
σ2 +
∑J
j=1H
JE
je p
J
jq
)
gq
(
pq,p
J
q
)
,− log
(
σ2 +HSEqe pq +
∑J
j=1H
JE
je p
J
jq
)
− log
(
σ2 +
∑J
j=1H
JD
jq p
J
jq
)
.
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tion of (P) using any of the distributed algorithms in-
troduced in Section IV. For instance, Algorithm 1 based
on a dual decomposition loop (cf. Algorithm 3) special-
ized to (P) is given in Algorithm 4, where in (32),
Xq ,
{
xq , (pq,p
J
q) ≥ 0 : pq ≤ Pq and (26) holds
}
and
θ˜q(xq;x
ν
q ) is defined as
θ˜q(xq;x
ν
q ) , fq (xq)−
∂gq(x
ν
q )
∂pq
pq −
J∑
j=1
∂gq(x
ν
q )
∂pJjq
pJjq
+
τq
2
‖xq − xνq‖2,
(31)with
∂gq(xq)
∂pq
, − H
SE
qe
σ2 +HSEqe pq +
∑J
j=1H
JE
je p
J
jq
∂gq(xq)
∂pJjq
, − H
JE
je
σ2 +HSEqe pq +
∑J
j=1H
JE
je p
J
jq
− H
JD
jq
σ2 +
∑J
j=1H
JD
jq p
J
jq
, j = 1, . . . , J.
Algorithm 4: DC-based Algorithm for (P)
Data: τ , (τq)Qq=1 ≥ 0, {γν} > 0, {αt} > 0 and x0 ,(
p0,pJ,0
) ∈ P . Set ν = 0.
(S.1): If xν , (pν ,pJ,ν) satisfies a termination criterion,
STOP;
(S.2a): Choose λ0 , (λ0j )Jj=1 ≥ 0. Set n = 0.
(S.2b): If λt , (λtj)Jj=1 satisfies a termination criterion, set
x̂ (xν) = (pt, νq ,p
J, ν, t
q )
Q
q=1 and go to (S.3);
(S.2c): The legitimate users q = 1, . . . , Q compute in
parallel (p ν, tq ,pJ, ν, tq ) given by
(p ν, tq ,p
J, ν, t
q ) , argmin
xq,(pq,pJq)∈Xq
{
θ˜q(xq;x
ν
q ) + λ
tTpJq
}
;
(32)
(S.2d): Update λ , (λj)Jj=1: for all j = 1, . . . , J ,
λt+1j ,
[
0, λtj + α
t
(
Q∑
q=1
pJ, ν, tjq − P Jj
)]
+
; (33)
(S.2e): Set t← t+ 1 and go back to (S.2b);
(S.3): Set xν+1 = xν + γν ( x̂ (xν)− xν );
(S.4): ν ← ν + 1 and go to (S.1).
If the sequences {γν} > 0 and {αt} > 0 are chosen
according to one of the rules stated in Theorems 1 and 4,
respectively, Algorithm 4 converges to a stationary solution
of the social problem (P) (in the sense of Theorem 1), and
thus to a QGNE of Gsm [cf. Proposition 3c)], which is also a
restricted B-QGNE of G [cf. Proposition 2d)].
Remark 4 (On the implementation of Algorithm 4). Once
the CSI is available at the users’ sides, Algorithm 4 can
be implemented in a distributed way, with limited signaling
only between the legitimate users and the friendly jammers
(no communications among the users or the eavesdropper is
required). Indeed, in the inner loop of the algorithm, given
the current value of the price λ, all the users simultaneously
update the power profiles (pq,pJq) solving locally a strongly
convex optimization problem. Then, they communicate to the
friendly jammers the amount of power they need resulting
from the optimization. Given the power requests from the
users, the jammers update in parallel and independently their
price λj performing an inexpensive scalar projection [cf. (33)],
and then broadcast the new price value to the legitimate users.
We remark that the proposed scheme require the same CSI
and communication overhead than CJ approaches proposed in
the literature (see, e.g., [21], [22]).
Remark 5 (More general formulation). For the sake of sim-
plicity, in the previous sections, we assumed uniform power
allocation over the spectrum (still to optimize) from the users
and the friendly jammers. We remark however that game G
in (24) [game Gsm in (27) and problem (P) in (30)] can be
generalized to the case of nonuniform power allocations (over
flat-fading channels) and the proposed algorithms extended
accordingly. We omit more details because of space limitation.
5) Numerical Results: In this subsection, we present some
experiments validating our theoretical findings. We compare
our Algorithm 4 with centralized and applicable decentralized
schemes existed in the literature (adapted to our formulation).
System setup. All the experiments are obtained in the following
setting, unless stated otherwise. All the users and jammers
have the same power budget, i.e. Pq = P Jj = P , and we
set snr = P/σ2 = 10dB. The position of the users, jammers,
and eavesdropper are randomly generated within a square area;
the channel gains HSDqq , HSEqe , HJDjq and HJEje are Rayleigh
distributed with mean equal to one and normalized by the
(square) distance between the transmitter and the receiver;
our results are collected only for the channel realizations
satisfying condition (26). When present, there are J = ⌊Q/2⌋
jammers. Algorithm 4 is initialized by choosing the zero
power allocation, and it is terminated when the absolute value
of the difference of the System Secrecy Rate (SSR) in two
consecutive iterations becomes smaller than 1e-5. Similarly,
the inner loop is terminated when the difference of the norm
of the prices in two consecutive rounds is less than 1e-2.
Example 1−Comparison with decentralized schemes. In
Fig. 2(a), we plot the average SSR (taken over 50 independent
channel realizations) versus the number Q of legitimate users
achieved by our Algorithm 4 (blue-line curves) and by solv-
ing the SSR maximization game while assuming i) uniform
power allocation for the jammers (black-line curves); or ii) no
friendly jammers available (red-line curve). In Fig. 2(b) we
plot the average SSR versus the snr for the case of 10 main
users; the rest of the setting is as in Fig. 2(a). The figures show
that the proposed approach yields much higher SSR than that
achievable by the other schemes, and the gain becomes more
significant as the number of users or the snr increases.
Example 2−Comparison with centralized schemes. Since
Algorithm 4 converges to a stationary solution of the social
problem (30), it is natural to compare our scheme with
available centralized methods attempting to compute locally
or globally optimal solutions (but without rigorously verifying
their optimality). More specifically, we consider two schemes:
i) the NEOS server [33] based on MINOS solver and PSwarm;
and ii) the standard centralized SCA algorithm for DC pro-
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Fig. 3: Comparison between our (distributed) Algorithm 4 and centralized
approaches.
grams (see, e.g., [12], [13]). Even thought these algorithms
are computationally very demanding and not implementable
in a distributed network, they represent a good benchmark
to test our distributed algorithm. In Fig. 3(a) we plot the
probability that the SSR exceeds a given value SSR versus
SSR, whereas in Fig. 3(b) we report the average SSR versus
the number of legitimate users. All the curves are computed
running 100 independent experiments. The figures show that
our Algorithm 4 outperforms MINOS, and quite surprisingly
it has the same performance of PSwarm and SCA schemes.
This means that, at least for the experiments we simulated,
Algorithm 4 provides in a distributed way solutions of (30)
that are very close to those obtained by centralized methods.
Example 3−Convergence Speed: Table I shows the average
number of inner and outer iterations required by Algorithm 4
to converge versus the number of legitimate users, when
Rules 1 and 2 [c.f. (12) and (13)] are used for the step-size
γν . The parameters in the two rules are set as β1 = 1e-6,
β2 = 1e-4, and ǫ = 1e-5. This average has been taken over
50 independent channel realizations. Notice that, when Rule
2 is used, the number of outer iterations is greatly reduced
in comparison to that obtained performing Rule 1. Note also
that, the average number of inner iterations per outer iteration
is slightly increased in the former case; however, overall,
Algorithm 4 with Rule 2 seems to be faster than the same
algorithm based on Rule 1. As far as the quality of the achieved
SSR is concern, we observed results consistent to Fig. 3.
B. Case Study #2: Design of CR MIMO systems
1) System model and problem formulation: Consider a
hierarchical MIMO CR system composed of P PUs sharing
number of users (Q) 2 5 10 15 20 30 50
Rule 1 - outer iterations 46.80 53.62 73.52 95.48 97.74 138.00 175.56
Rule 1 - inner iterations 1.02 1.08 1.19 1.23 1.27 1.23 1.21
Rule 2 - outer iterations 46.66 56.58 66.78 76.12 72.42 83.44 89.56
Rule 2 - inner iterations 1.02 1.08 1.20 1.28 1.30 1.30 1.33
TABLE I: Average number of outer iterations and inner iterations per outer iteration
in Algorithm 4 for different choices of diminishing step-size rules.
the licensed spectrum with I SUs; the network of SUs is
modeled as a I-user vector Gaussian interference channel.
Each SU i is equipped with nTi and nRi transmit and
receive antennas, respectively, and PUs may have multiple
antennas. LetHji∈CnRj×nTi (resp.Gpi) be the cross-channel
matrix between the secondary transmitter i and the secondary
receiver j (resp. primary receiver p). Under basic information
theoretical assumptions, the transmission rate of SU i is
ri(Qi,Q−i) , log det
(
I+HHiiRi(Q−i)
−1HiiQi
) (34)
whereQi is the transmit covariance matrix of SU i (to be opti-
mized), Q−i , (Qj)j 6=i, Ri(Q−i) , Rni+
∑
j 6=iHijQjH
H
ij
with Rni ≻ 0 being the covariance matrix of the noise plus
the interference generated by the active PUs. Each SU i is
subject to the following local constraints
Qi ,
{
Qi  0 : tr(Qi) ≤ P toti , Qi ∈ Zi
}
, (35)
where P toti is the total transmit power and Zi ⊆ Cni×ni is an
abstract closed and convex set suitable to accommodate (pos-
sibly) additional local constraints, such as: i) null constraints
UHi Qi = 0, with Ui being a nTi × ri (with ri < nTi ),
which prevents SUs to transmit along some prescribed “di-
rections” (the columns of Ui); and ii) soft and peak power
shaping constraints in the form of tr(THi QiTi) ≤ Iavei and
λmax(FHi QiFi) ≤ Ipeaki , which limits to Iavei > 0 and Ipeaki >
0 the total average and peak average power allowed to be
radiated along the range space of matricesTi ∈ CnTi×nGi and
Fi ∈ CnTi×nFi , respectively. Adopting the spectrum underlay
architecture, the interference power at the primary receivers
is regulated by imposing global interference constraints to
the SUs, in the form of
∑
i tr(G
H
piQiGpi) ≤ I totp for all
p = 1, . . . , P, where I totp > 0 is the interference threshold
imposed by PU p.
The design of the CR system can be formulated as
maximize
Q1,...,QI
θ(Q) ,
∑I
i=1 ri(Qi,Q−i)
subject to Qi ∈ Qi, i = 1, . . . , I,∑
i tr(G
H
piQiGpi) ≤ I totp , p = 1, . . . , P.
(36)
Special cases of the nonconvex sum-rate maximization
problem (36) have already been studied in the literature, e.g.,
in [7], [28]. However the theoretical convergence of current
algorithms is up to date an open problem. Since (36) is an
instance of (1), we can capitalize on the framework developed
in the first part of the paper and obtain readily a class of
distributed algorithms with provable convergence.
2) DC-based decomposition algorithms: We cast first (36)
into (1) (in the maximization form). Exploring the DC-
structure of the rates ri(Qi,Q−i), the sum-rate θ(Q) can
indeed be rewritten as the sum of a concave and convex
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function, namely: θ(Q) =
∑
i (fi(Q)− gi(Q)), where
fi(Q) , log det
(
Rni +
∑
j=1HijQjH
H
ij
)
gi(Q−i) , log det
(
Rni +
∑
j 6=iHijQjH
H
ij
)
.
We can now use the machinery developed in Sec. III. It is
not difficult to show that the approximation function θ˜(x;xν)
in (5) (to be maximized) becomes (up to a constant term)
θ˜(Q;Qν) ,
∑
i θ˜i(Q;Q
ν), with
θ˜i(Q;Q
ν),ri(Qi,Q
ν
−i)−〈Πi(Qν),Qi−Qνi 〉−τi ‖Qi −Qνi ‖2F
(37)
where Qν , (Qνi )Ii=1 with each Qνi  0, 〈A,B〉 ,
Re
{
tr(AHB)
}
, ‖•‖F is the Frobenius norm, and
Πi(Q
ν) ,
∑
j∈Ni
HHji R˜j(Q
ν
−j)Hji, (38)
with Ni denoting the set of neighbors of user i (i.e., the set
of users j’s which user i interferers with), and
R˜j(Q
ν
−j) , Rj(Q
ν
−j)
−1 − (Rj(Qν−j) +HjjQνjHHjj)−1.
Therefore a stationary solution of (36) can be efficiently
computed using any of the distributed algorithms introduced
in Section IV; one just needs to replace θ˜(x;xν) with
θ˜(Q;Qν) (and the minimization with the maximization). For
instance, Algorithm 1 based on a dual decomposition loop
(cf. Algorithm 3) can be written in the form of Algorithm 5.
Convergence (in the sense of Theorem 1) is guaranteed if the
step-size sequences {γν} and {αn} > 0 are chosen according
to one of the rules stated in Theorems 1 and 4, respectively.
Algorithm 5: Dual-based Algorithm for (36).
Data: τ , (τi)Ii=1 ≥ 0, {γν} > 0, {αt} > 0 and Q0i ∈ Q for
all i. Set ν = 0.
(S.1): If Qν , (Qνi )Ii=1 satisfies a termination criterion,
STOP;
(S.2a): Choose λ0 , (λ0p)Pp=1 ≥ 0. Set t = 0.
(S.2b): If λt , (λtp)Pp=1 satisfies a termination criterion, set
Q̂ (Qν) , (Qt, νi )
I
i=1 and go to (S.3);
(S.2c): The SUs solve in parallel the following strongly
convex optimization problems: for all i = 1, . . . , I ,
Q
ν, t
i , argmax
Qi∈Qi
{
θ˜i(Qi;Q
ν)−
P∑
p=1
λtp tr(G
H
piQiGpi)
}
;
(39)
(S.2d): Update λ , (λp)Pp=1: for all p = 1, . . . , P ,
λt+1p ,
[
λtp + α
t
(
I∑
i=1
tr(GHpiQ
ν, t
i Gpi)− Imaxp
)]
+
; (40)
(S.2e): Set t← t+ 1 and go back to (S.2b);
(S.3): Set Qν+1 = Qν + γν
(
Q̂ (Qν)−Qν
)
;
(S.4): ν ← ν + 1 and go to (S.1).
3) Discussion on the implementation of Algorithm 5 : The
algorithm is a double loop scheme in the sense described next.
Inner loop: In this loop, at every iteration t: i) First, all SUs
solve in parallel their strongly convex optimization problems
(39), for fixed λt = (λtp)Pp=1, resulting in the optimal solu-
tions (Q ν, ti )Ii=1; ii) Then, given the new interference levels∑I
i=1 tr(G
H
piQ
ν, t
i Gpi), the prices λ are updated in parallel
via (40), resulting in λt+1 = (λt+1p )Pp=1. The loop terminates
when {λt} meets the termination criterion in (S.2b).
Outer loop: It consists in updating Qνi ’s according to (S.3).
Communication overhead: The proposed algorithm is fairly
distributed. Indeed, given the interference generated by the
other users [the covariance matrix Ri(Q−i), which can be
locally measured], and the interference price Πi(Qν), each
SU can efficiently and locally compute the optimal covariance
matrix Q ν, ti by solving (39). Note that, for some specific
structures of the feasible sets Qi and channels (e.g., Zi = ∅,
full-column rank channel matrices Hii, and τi = 0), a solution
of (39) is available in closed form (up to the multipliers asso-
ciated with the power budget constraints) [7]. The estimation
of the prices Πi(Qν) requires some signaling exchange but
only among nearby users. Interestingly, the pricing expression
(38) as well as the signaling overhead necessary to compute
it coincides with that of pricing schemes proposed in the
literature to solve related problems [7], [8], [10].
The natural candidates for updating the prices in the inner
loop are the PUs, after measuring locally the current overall
interference
∑I
i=1 tr(G
H
piQ
ν, t
i Gpi) from the SUs. Note that
this update is computationally inexpensive (it is a projection
onto R+), can be performed in parallel among PUs, and
does not require any signaling exchange with the SUs. The
new value of the prices is then broadcasted to the SUs.
In CR scenarios where the PUs cannot participate in the
updating process, the SUs themselves can perform the price
update, at the cost of more signaling, e.g., using consensus
algorithms. Alternatively, if the primary receivers have a fixed
geographical location, it might be possible to install some
monitoring devices close to each primary receiver having the
functionality of price computation and broadcasting.
As a final remark note that, since Algorithm 5 is a dual-
base scheme, it is scalable with the number of SUs. However,
for the same reasons, there might happen that the interference
constraints are not satisfied during the intermediate iterations.
This issue can be alleviated in practice by choosing a “large”
λ0 as initial price. An alternative distributed scheme which
does not suffer from this issue can be readily obtained using
the primal-based decomposition approach introduced in Sec.
IV-B; we omit the details because of space limitation.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we proposed a novel decomposition framework
to compute stationary solutions of nonconvex (possibly DC)
sum-utility minimization problems with coupling convex con-
straints. We developed a class of (inexact) best-response-like
algorithms, where all the users iteratively solve in parallel
a suitably convexified version of the original DC program.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first set of dis-
tributed algorithms with provable convergence for multiuser
DC programs with coupling constraints. Finally, we tested our
methodology on two problems: i) a novel secrecy rate game
(for which we provided a nontrivial DC formulation); and
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ii) the sum-rate maximization problems over CR MIMO net-
works. Our experiments show that our distributed algorithms
reach performance comparable (and sometimes better) than
centralized schemes.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The proof follows from [10, Th.3] and Proposition 4 below,
which establishes the main properties of the best-response map
Ξ ∋ y 7→ x̂(y) ∈ Ξ defined in (8), as required by [10, Th.3].
Proposition 4. Given the DC program (1) under A1-A4, the
map Ξ ∋ y 7→ x̂(y) ∈ Ξ defined in (8) has the following
properties:
(a): For every given y ∈ Ξ, the vector x̂(y) − y is a descent
direction of the objective function θ(x) at y:
(x̂(y) − y)T ∇xθ(y) ≤ −cτ ‖x̂(y) − y‖2, (41)
with cτ defined in (10);
(b): x̂(•) is Lipschitz continuos on Ξ, with constant Lx̂ ,
L
∇θ˜/cτ , where L∇θ˜ is defined in Lemma 3 below;
(c): The set of fixed points of x̂(•) coincides with the set of
stationary points of the optimization problem (1); therefore
x̂(•) has a fixed point.
Proof. Before proving the proposition, we introduce the fol-
lowing lemma, whose proof is omitted (see attached material).
Lemma 3. In the setting of Proposition 4, ∇θ˜(x; •) is uni-
formly Lipschitz on Ξ, that is, for any given x ∈ Ξ,∥∥∥∇xθ˜(x;y) −∇xθ˜(x; z)∥∥∥ ≤ L∇θ˜ ‖z− y‖ , ∀y, z ∈ Ξ,
(42)
with L2
∇θ˜
, 4 (L2∇θ + 2
∑I
i=1 L
2
∇fi
+ τmax), where L∇θ and
L∇fi are defined in assumption A3, and τmax , maxi τ2i .
We prove next only (a) and (b) of Proposition 4.
(a): Given y ∈ Ξ, by definition, x̂(y) satisfies the minimum
principle associated with (8): for all z , (zi)Ii=1 ∈ Ξ,
(z− x̂(y))T ∇xθ˜(x̂(y);y) ≥ 0
I∑
i=1
(zi − x̂i(y))T
∇xifi(x̂i(y),y−i) +∑
j 6=i
∇xifj(y)
−
I∑
j=1
∇xigj(y) + τi (x̂i(y) − yi)
 ≥ 0.
(43)
Letting zi = yi, and, adding and subtracting ∇xifi(y) in each
term i of the sum in (43), we obtain:
(y − x̂(y))T ∇xθ(y)
≥
I∑
i=1
(x̂i(y)− yi)T (∇xifi(x̂i(y),y−i)−∇xifi(y))
+
N∑
i=1
τi‖x̂i(y) − yi‖2 ≥ cτ ‖x̂(y) − y‖2,
(44)
where in the last inequality we used the definition of cτ . This
completes the proof of (a).
(b): Let y, z ∈ Ξ; by the minimum principle, we have
(v − x̂(y))T ∇xθ˜(x̂(y);y) ≥ 0 ∀v ∈ Ξ
(w− x̂(z))T ∇xθ˜(x̂(z); z) ≥ 0 ∀w ∈ Ξ. (45)
Setting v = x̂(z) and w = x̂(y) and summing the two
inequalities above, after some manipulations, we obtain:
(x̂(z) − x̂(y))T
(
∇xθ˜(x̂(z); z) −∇xθ˜(x̂(y); z)
)
≤ (x̂(y) − x̂(z))T
(
∇xθ˜(x̂(y); z) −∇xθ˜(x̂(y);y)
)
.
(46)
The Lipschitz property of x̂(•), as stated in Proposition 4(b),
comes from (46) using the following lower and upper bounds:
(x̂(z) − x̂(y))T
(
∇xθ˜(x̂(z); z) −∇xθ˜(x̂(y);y)
)
≥ cτ ‖x̂(z) − x̂(y)‖2
(47)
and
(x̂(y) − x̂(z))T
(
∇xθ˜(x̂(y); z) −∇xθ˜(x̂(y);y)
)
≤ L
∇θ˜ ‖x̂(y) − x̂(z)‖ ‖z− y‖
(48)
where (47) is a direct consequence of the uniform strong con-
vexity of θ˜, whereas (48) follows from the Cauchy-Schwartz
inequality and Lemma 3. Combining (46), (47), and (48), we
obtain the desired result.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
(a) It is not difficult to check that G is an exact potential game
with potential function Φ(p,pJ) ,
∑
q r
s
q(pq,p
J
q). It turns
out that any optimal solution of the associated multiplayer
maximization problem:
maximize
(p,pJ)≥0
Φ(p,pJ)
subject to: pq ≤ Pq, ∀q = 1, . . . , Q
Q∑
r=1
pJjr ≤ P Jj , ∀ j = 1, . . . , J,
(49)
is a GNE of G. Since (49) has a solution, there must exist a
GNE for G.
(b) The proof is based on similar arguments as those in (a).
(c) Suppose that x⋆ , (p⋆q ,pJ⋆q )Qq=1 is a GNE of G satisfying(26) for all q = 1, . . . , Q. Then, for every q, we have:(
p⋆q ,p
J⋆
q
) ∈ Psmq (pJ⋆−q) and
r˜sq
(
p⋆q ,p
J⋆
q
)
= rsq
(
p⋆q ,p
J⋆
q
) ≥ rsq (pq,pJq) = r˜sq (pq,pJq) ,
for all
(
pq,p
J
q
) ∈ Psmq (pJ⋆−q). Therefore, (p⋆q ,pJ⋆q ) is a
solution of (27), with pJ−q = pJ⋆−q.
(d) Suppose that x⋆ , (p⋆q ,pJ⋆q )Qq=1 is a GNE of Gsm. Then,
for each q,
(
p⋆q ,p
J⋆
q
) ∈ Pq(pJ⋆−q) and
rsq
(
p⋆q ,p
J⋆
q
)
= r˜sq
(
p⋆q ,p
J⋆
q
) ≥ r˜sq (pq,pJq) = rsq (pq,pJq) ,
for all
(
pq,p
J
q
) ∈ Psmq (pJ⋆−q). Since rsq (pq,pJq) = 0 for all(
pq,p
J
q
) ∈ Pq(pJ⋆−q) \ Psmq (pJ⋆−q) , we have
rsq
(
p⋆q ,p
J⋆
q
) ≥ rsq (pq,pJq) , ∀ (pq,pJq) ∈ Pq(pJ⋆−q).
Therefore,
(
p⋆q ,p
J⋆
q
)
is a solution of (24), with pJ−q = pJ⋆−q .
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
(a) It follows from Proposition 1(a) that a GNE of G always
exists; since the players’ optimization problems in G have
polyhedral sets, every GNE of G is also a B-QGNE. Therefore
a B-QGNE of G exists.
(b) It follows from Proposition 1(b) and similar arguments as
in the proof of (a).
(c) This proof is based on the following fact, regarding the
directional derivative of the plus function [34, Eq. 2.124]:
rsq
′(z;y − z) = [max(0, r˜sq(•))]′(z;y − z)
=
{
max
(
0,∇xq r˜sq(z)T (y − z)
)
, if r˜sq(z) = 0
∇xq r˜sq(z)T (y − z), if r˜sq(z) > 0.
(50)
Let x⋆ ,
(
x⋆q
)Q
q=1
be a (restricted) B-QGNE of G satisfying
(26) for all q = 1, . . . , Q, with x⋆q ,
(
p⋆q ,p
J⋆
q
)
. Then, for
every q, based on (50), consider the following two cases:
Case I: r˜sq(x⋆q) > 0. For all xq ∈ Psmq (pJ⋆−q) we have
0 ≥ rsq ′(x⋆q ;xq − x⋆q) = ∇xq r˜sq(x⋆q)T
(
xq − x⋆q
)
.
Case II: r˜sq(x⋆q) = 0. For all xq ∈ Psmq (pJ⋆−q) we have
0 ≥ rsq ′(x⋆q ;xq − x⋆q) ≥ ∇xq r˜sq(x⋆q)T
(
xq − x⋆q
)
.
The desired result follows readily from the above two cases.
(d) Let x⋆ , (x⋆q)Qq=1 be a QGNE of Gsm, with x⋆q ,(
p⋆q ,p
J⋆
q
)
. Consider an arbitrary q. Then x⋆q ∈ Pq(pJ⋆−q).
Based on (50), consider the following two cases:
Case I: r˜sq(x⋆q) > 0. For all xq ∈ Psmq (pJ⋆−q) we have
rsq
′(x⋆q ;xq − x⋆q) = ∇xq r˜sq(x⋆q)T
(
xq − x⋆q
) ≤ 0
Case II: r˜sq(x⋆q) = 0. For all xq ∈ Psmq (pJ⋆−q) we have
rsq
′(x⋆q ;xq − x⋆q) = max
(
0,∇xq r˜sq(x⋆q)T
(
xq − x⋆q
))
= 0
The desired result comes readily from the above two cases.
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